Talk:Battle of the Atlantic

Losses in the battle of the Atlantic

It is listed that 175 Allied warships are lost in the battle of the Atlantic. In lots of WW2 literature, 175 is quoted as the nbr of warships torpedoed by U-boats. But surely not al those losses are tied to the battle of the Atlantic ? All the warships sunk by german U-boats in the mediterranean will not be linked to the battle of the Atlantic ? Maybe if you look at the bigger picture you could argue that somehow the nbr of warships lost at any place affects indirectly the battle of the Atlantic, but event then ? For exemple, how would the sinking of the light cruiser Galatea by U-557 in late 1941 possibly affect the battle of the Atlantic ?

Likewise I see that on German side all destroyed surface ships are listed as victims of the battle of the Atlantic. But for exemple Blucher is sunk during the invasion of Norway and Scharnhorst is sunk during an attack on an Arctic convoy. How would you link the tonnage war of the battle of the atlantic to arctic convoys and the Norway invasion ?

Would it not be better not to mention exact numbers ? Klutserke (talk) 21:10, 5 January 2023 (UTC)

Of the 4 battleships, Only Bismarck sank during the battle of the Atlantic. Gneisenau and Tirpitz were destroyed in port, Scharnhorst in the Arctic.

Of the heavy cruisers, Ony Graf spee sank during a raid. Scheer and Deutschland were sunk in the Baltic, Hipper was sunk in Baltic port Blucher was sunk during invasion of Norway. Some light cruisers and destroyers were also lost in the invasion

So you cannot count all German surface ships lost in WWII as ships lost during battle of Atlantic

Same goes for the nbr of 784 U-boats. Lots wee send to Mediterranenan, Black see, Far East, Arctic,.... these did not sink as part of battle of Atlantic Klutserke (talk) 23:24, 18 November 2023 (UTC)

Whilst you have a point on some aspects, the rest of it depends on the definition of the Battle of the Atlantic. The huge bombing effort against the German surface ships in Brest was definitely part of the campaign – it is not much of a logical leap to suggest that Gneisenau's damage, first on her retreat from Brest in the Channel dash and then in dock afterwards was integral to the overall battle. Tirpitz was a potential threat to Atlantic convoys, even though never deployed against them. (And, of course, Scharnhorst remained a similar threat to Atlantic convoys even after her redeployment to Norway.) Arctic convoys to Russia originated in Atlantic ports. Whilst there is ambiguity over whether the Norwegian Sea (where some of the fighting took place) is part of the Atlantic, books about the Battle of the Atlantic do tend to cover Arctic Convoys. As ever, when Wikipedia tries to summarise a subject, detailed examination makes clear that there are problems. At a minimum, the way the article deals with this should be based on a number of sources so as to capture the range of opinion among historians. ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 08:59, 19 November 2023 (UTC)

Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen returned to Germany as the Germans saw it was not realistic anymore to organize raids on the Atlantic with them, they were going to be redeployed to Norway, where their primery task was to deter an Allied invasion there. So they were taken off the battle of the Atlantic by returning to Germany and hence I would not count the loss of Gneisenau within he context of the battle of the atlantic.

Similar for Tirpitz : its first assignment was in the baltic, to guard against possible breakout of the russians in Kronstadt, then it went to Norway as a deterrent for invasion there. The Allies taking into account the remote possibility of a breakout of Tirpitz in atlantic does not make it a participant in the battle of the Atlantic. At the time the Tirpitz was sunk, she was a stationnary battery and could certainly not participate anymore in any sea battle at all.

The battle of the atlantic is certainly the bulk of many books on WWII europa naval warfare, but depending on the title, arctic convoys are scantly covered. if it's about war at sea sure both battle of atlantic and arctic convoys are there but like in the book of Costello which is used for this wiki article, and which has the exact title 'battle of the Atlantic', the arctic convoys are only mentionned where the general situation for the moment is described. Dönitz himself saw the arctic much like the mediterranean : it drained U-boats away from his main battle of the atlantic so he did not see it as much of a help in the battle of the atlantic.

Do I understand correctly that you agree on the cruisers and the u-boats ? Klutserke (talk) 11:15, 19 November 2023 (UTC)

There are two sides to every story. You cite the German reasoning behind the withdrawal of the heavy ships from Brest. However, the Allies could not be sure on the thinking behind that move, nor could they be unconcerned about any sort of change of plan. Essentially you have a Fleet in being.(That concept is mentioned in Symonds, Craig L.. World War II at Sea: A Global History (p. 460).) That was especially true for the Tirpitz. The full extent of her disablement at the time of her final loss was unknown to the Allies. Hence the interest in her destruction. That this is relevant to the Battle of the Atlantic is confirmed by historians like Evan Mawdsley with "The Atlantic situation was also better, with the sinking of the Scharnhorst in December 1943, and serious damage inflicted on the Tirpitz in September 1943 and April 1944." (bold added) (The War for the Seas: A Maritime History of World War II (p. 717).) Because ships, by their very nature, can move, it is over-restricting to put precise geographic limits on where they were lost. The answer for the article is to be a little more nuanced about losses. That might extend to mentioning losses of U-boats in the Mediterranean, as every boat lost there was one that could not be used in the Atlantic. I appreciate that this is less than a complete answer, but my point is that this is an opportunity for Wikipedia to avoid one of its common failings: to get across some of the shades of grey in a subject, rather than confidently stating something that conceals all that detail. ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 12:35, 19 November 2023 (UTC)

So since losses need far more context I propose to take the concrete nbrs and names of losses out of the intro and expand that part in the 'outCome' chapter, where for the moment that same info is more or less duplicated. We can add also more statistics in the outcome chapter Klutserke (talk) 23:13, 19 November 2023 (UTC)

Noted, but with the lead intended to be a summary of the article, losses are probably an important enough subject to be touched on there. If it can be done sensibly, there needs to be some high level treatment of losses that would do this, but it is something of a puzzle how to word it. It may be the case that you have tried to achieve this, without a good result – in which case, being silent is the best alternative. ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 13:37, 20 November 2023 (UTC)

Azores air gap

The article gives no real mention of the Azores air gap. We just have the agreement to base Allied aircraft there appearing in the article, with no explanation of the significance. References for "the other air gap, near the Azores" include Milner, Marc. Battle of the Atlantic (p. 124). The History Press. This is also explained by Mawdsley's War of the Seas. Yet the article does not explain the significance of this arrangement. Other sources also deal with this subject. It seems to be a significant failing of the article. ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 00:13, 11 November 2023 (UTC)

Collaboration by French dockyard workers

The article has no mention of the collaboration by French naval dockyard workers. (page numbers in following text are from Hellwinkel 2014, which is already used as a source in the article.) This was very important to the Kriegsmarine as there were limited numbers of German workers who could be moved to France to service German warships and submarines. The first French collaboration was the fitting out of fishing vessels for mine sweeping and harbour defence – installing rails for French depth charges and fitting various guns and machine guns, as well as using the ample supply of French Navy minesweeping equipment that had escaped demolition work.(p 34, ) The French Navy carried out some minesweeping activity (under the terms of the Armistice) in their Atlantic ports.(p 35) Most important, though, was the skilled dockyard workforce and the workshops that had not been destroyed.(p 40 - and other pages t.b.a.) That workforce was, by and large, back at their posts by 4 July 1940.(p 114) The German plans for staffing their Atlantic bases was, initially, totally unrealistic. For instance they requested 2,700 skilled shipyard workers to be sent from Germany. Yet the Wilhelmshaven naval shipyard only had a total workforce of around 4,000 – depleting those staff would bring shipbuilding and repair activity to a virtual standstill.(p 48) The gap was filled by the French naval dockyard workers who were a "willing workforce". Overall, without this French collaboration, the Battle of the Atlantic would have been very different.

The only balancing component of the story is the spying done by, for instance, Jean Philippon, a French Navy officer who provided important intelligence information to the Allies on German shipping movements. (Also Jacques Stosskopf who was executed by the Nazis for spying).(p. 183)

To justify this collaboration, the French dockyard workers had to support their families and otherwise had no way of earning a living.(p 152 and elsewhere)

As a postscript: For example, by February 1941 only 470 German shipyard workers had arrived at Brest, whilst the Naval Arsenal had 6,349 French workers.(p118) Though work on capital ships was generally done by Germans, French employees worked extensively on submarines and the smaller military vessels in the surface fleet. German Navy reports indicate that this was a willing workforce and that there were no incidences of sabotage. As well as working on ship repairs, the French provided a significant fire-fighting force to help negate the effect of Allied air raids. (postscript taken from Brest, France where it appears as a footnote.) ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 15:47, 11 November 2023 (UTC)

Here is the link to the French Wikipedia article on Philippon[1] ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 19:49, 11 November 2023 (UTC)

Useful source?

Eric Grove (2019) ‘The Battle of the Atlantic’: A legend deconstructed, The Mariner's Mirror, 105:3, 336-339, DOI: 10.1080/00253359.2019.1589123 may be a useful source. This noted maritime historian provides an overview of the whole subject and certainly presents a view which should be taken into account. ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 08:47, 30 November 2023 (UTC)

reviewing - failed verification

Hoi @ThoughtIdRetired thanks for reviewing some of my edits. Related to one of these reviews with a failed verification on Blair p.38 for the following edit :

"Aircraft nor ASDIC were considered a serious threat at the time: ASDIC could not detect a surfaced submarine and its range was less than that of an elektric torpedo, aircraft could not operate at night and during day an alert U-boat could dive before the aircraft attacked"

On Blair p.38 i read on the last paragraph of the page : Dönitz thought the new ASW weapons, namely sonar and aircraft, were greatly exaggerated..[]..range of one and half mile at most .[].. could not detect a surfaced submarine..[]. elektric torpedoes had a greater range ( three miles ) .[]... aircraft did not patrol at night..[].. a keenly alert U-boat bridge watch could see or hear aircraft before it saw the u-boat. with its ability to dive quickly ( thirty seconds ) and deep, a properly alert modern U-boat could avoid attack by any known aircraft.

I think that covers well the statements I wrote for that reference, did I miss something ?

Kind Regards, Klutserke (talk) 19:01, 5 December 2023 (UTC)

Firstly it is not clear in the article that these statements ([Neither]] aircraft nor ASDIC were considered....) just represent the view of Dönitz. The article reads as though these were generally accepted views at the time – something which is contradicted by contemporaneous British Admiralty opinions. If the article is trying to state a general opinion, then the source does not support that, as it is just reporting the view of one person. If the article is trying just to give the opinion of Dönitz, then it should do so more clearly.

Secondly, the quote of the source given above misses a key word: Aircraft did not yet patrol at night (bold added). From this complete quote it seems that the source wants the reader to have in mind that night-time aircraft operations were, at a later stage, important. The article could usefully follow that lead – otherwise this gives a confusing read when set alongside, for instance, the Leigh Light.

Thirdly, the whole bit about the torpedoes outranging ASDIC is theoretical only. Historians working in this field generally point out that U-boat commanders tried to fire from a close range to avoid the risk of a miss. This is where the defect of Blair as a source comes to the fore. His training is as a journalist, so as a source he should not be preferred over a historian. (WP:HISTRS). One could even then go on to conclude that Blair's service as an NCO on a submarine in the Pacific is actually some hindrance to his historical interpretation of the material. There are some scathing reviews of his work (try U-boat net, for one). I do not think that Blair is adequately dealing with his sources in this case – certainly not to the extent that it assists us in what the article is trying to say.

Probably more to say on this now, but I am out of time to give a fuller answer. ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 22:35, 5 December 2023 (UTC)

Section: Shipping and U-boat sinkings each month

The section Shipping and U-boat sinkings each month seems to assemble a small number of views based on Max Hastings and a somewhat outdated German perspective on what happened. Overall it constructs an argument that improved radar was the major component of Allied success. The graphs, in particular, are highly misleading.

Looking to a more recent source,(Overy, War for the Seas, 2019) we find a much more all-encompassing summary of the growth of Allied success. This could be summarised as a coming together of:

• Signals intelligence, but noting that this was not the "central causal factor" of success and that there were significant delays in Enigma decrypts at times.
• Operational research, particularly including civilian input.
• What is emphasised is "British sea/air forces and their highly trained crews and first-rate electronic equipment". This was made up of:

• New additional escorts, including ships of better design as well as simply more ships.
• Most of these ships now had centimetric radar.
• HF/DF had become common on these anti-submarine warships. A number of sources shows how this equipment was integral to many actions.
• Better talk to ship radios.
• Intensive training of the crews of anti-submarine ships.
• Long range aircraft equipped with centimetric radar. The shore based aircraft successes are particularly notable in January 1943 through May 1943.(pg 572)

Whilst centimetric radar is clearly part of the story, it is a very Dönitz-centred view that it is the explanation for the failure of the U-boat campaign.

Re-writing of this section, together with removal of the graphs, would be a significant improvement of the article. ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 15:28, 6 April 2024 (UTC)